Introduction
"This ain't your father's National Guard," 1 Vice President Joe Biden, Washington, D.C., on Feb. 22, 2010.
"The Air Force steadily has embraced the evolution and, ultimately, total transformation of its Reserve Components from a ready, but essentially strategic, reserve force to today's operationally capable and readily available force. Nevertheless, the Commission is convinced that the Air Force must change the way it organizes, functionally integrates, aligns, and employs the great Americans who volunteer to serve in its ranks." 
Background National Guard's Evolution from State Militia to Strategic Reserve and Total Force
The National Guard can trace its origins, with federal and state missions codified in Title 10 and Title 32 of United States Code, to the American colonial militias of the Seventeenth Century. Training became federally funded in the Militia Act of 1903. 3 These militias were not officially designated the National Guard until the National Defense Act of 1916. 4 This act also identified the National Guard as "the Army's primary reserve" and increased federally funded annual drill periods from 24 to 48 four-hour training periods per year and established fifteen day summer camps, now referred to as annual tours. 5 The National Guard Mobilization Act passed in 1933 amended the National Defense Act of 1916, re-designated the Militia Bureau as the National Guard Bureau and established the National Guard of the United States (NGUS). 6 Under this legislation, federally recognized and funded National Guard units and members also became part of the NGUS. 7 The National Security Act of 1947 established the ANG on 18 September 1947, the same day the independent Air Force was created. 8 The ANG has been involved in, and its members have served with distinction in, every war since its inception. Access to the Guard and Reserve was increased when Congress passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 authorizing the activation of the Guard and Reserve based on a presidential declaration of national emergencies. 9 Prior to this legislation, Guard and Reserve mobilization required Congressional declaration of emergency. Following the Vietnam War, the nation incrementally increased its reliance on the ANG to perform operational missions. In 1973, the United Stated ended conscription and established the all-volunteer force increasing the nation's dependence on the Guard and Reserve to meet wartime surge requirements. 10 Also in 1973, the Department of Defense (DoD)
established the "total force policy" requiring the military services to organize, train and equip Guard and Reserve forces to the same standards as the active duty to ensure compatibility for total force integration. 11 The National Guard has evolved, since its inception, from state militias to a strategic reserve fully integrated into the total force and is in the process of evolving further into an operational reserve.
Environment Setting the Stage for Operational Air Reserve Components (ARC)
Until recently, when forces were demobilized after a conflict, the ANG would return to its traditional role as a strategic reserve. Following the war in Iraq and approaching the end of operations in Afghanistan this paradigm is being reexamined. Faced with the fiscal challenges of the 2011 Budget Control Act, the operational desires and needs of the combatant commanders (CCDRs) and a pro-reserve component political environment, the Air Force and DoD have been pursuing an "Operational ARC."
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Given recent and pending active duty force structure reductions, even with the US withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, the active duty Air Forces will be challenged to meet all steady-state peacetime CCDR demand without tapping the ARC. Staggering national debt brought on by decades of deficit spending, thirteen years of war, ambitious domestic programs and monetary policies aimed at overcoming the 2008 economic collapse led to the Budget Control Act of 2011. The DoD is facing a $487 billion reduction in total obligation authority between fiscal year (FY) 2013 and 2021 unless Congress provides legislative relief. 13 As a result, the Air Force will have to make tough force structure decisions and active duty (AD) end strength will be reduced 19,800 billets (6%) from 330,700 to 310,900 by the end of FY 2015.
14 Over the same period ANG will only be reduced by 1,300 billets (1.2%) and the Reserve will be reduced by 1,900 (2.5%). 15 One strategy to preserve mission capability at a reduced cost is transferring force structure to and increasing reliance on the ARC. U.S.C. § 12304b mobilization authority. 21 In a statement to the Subcommittee on Oversight, The RFPB also calls for concurrent aircraft recapitalization in active duty and reserve components.
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Current and proposed definitions of the operational reserve lack sufficient specificity to make them useful to those tasked with implementing the concept. None of the definitions include limitations, timeframes, priorities, fiscal guidance, or planning factors. Though all parties involved struggle to define the operational reserve, the Air Force has nonetheless been moving hurriedly toward this ever-evolving and loosely defined objective. Having a standard definition is a critical first step to implementing the concept consistently across components, updating policy and redefining the resulting relationships.
Regardless of how it is defined, it is clear that the operational ANG, as a minimum, will involve increased utilization of the ANG to perform Title 10 missions during peacetime at a 1:5 mobilization-to-dwell ratio, concurrent recapitalization of force structure, Service Secretary authority to involuntarily mobilize Guardsmen, greater commitment from Guardsmen, and the need for assured access to Guard forces for deliberate planning. A change this significant should not be left to chance or incremental unplanned mission creep based on a loose and evermorphing definition. Force is not wasteful when employing ANG forces, this guidance should include minimum active duty deployment to dwell ratio that must be exceeded before employing ANG forces. The guidance must reinforce SecDef approved maximum acceptable ANG mobilization to dwell rates. To ensure the most economical use of ANG forces, the guidance must expressly state when rainbowing will be allowed and whether members will be allowed to volunteer for partial tours or if units will serve standard tour lengths. To ensure the Air Force acts consistent with legislative intent, planning and programming guidance must establish the level of specificity required to satisfy the Title 10 U.S.C. § 12304b statutory requirement for pre-planning/budgeting and congressional notification (broad generality or specific missions, strength numbers, dates, etc). Planning and programming for the use of 12304b mobilization authority requires interaction between services to ensure annual statutory limits are not exceeded. When making programmatic decisions impacting the ANG, the Air Force must remain conscious of the Title 32 U.S.C. § 104(c) mandate that "no change in the branch, organization, or allotment of a unit located entirely within a State may be made without the approval of its governor." 38 The NCSAF recommended increasing the steady state (non-OCO) MPA man-day funding from the FY 2015 level of 3,750 to 15,000 man-years. 39 limited to five years for non-exempt service. 44 However, several categories of service are exempted from the five-year limit and therefore extend the members protection under the law. 
Redefining the relationship between the ANG and its members
ANG members' time commitment will change significantly as a result of operationalizing the Guard. Current Laws and policies do not reflect this increased commitment. The ANG's main recruiting web site, GoANG, still encourages potential members to serve the country and community "one weekend a month and two weeks a year." 49 The site also informs potential recruits they could be mobilized during times of national or state emergency. 50 In coordination with the other services, the Air Force should submit a legislative proposal to extend Title 10 U.S.C. § 12731 early retirement credit to members for active duty service performed while mobilized under 10 U.S.C. § 12304b to recognize the increased operational use of the ARC.
When it comes to proposing legislative and DoD policy changes, the Air Force and ANG
should not try to go it alone. Most initiatives impacting the utilization of the National Guard will require inter-agency and inter-service support/coordination between the National Guard, Air
Force, and Army.
Conclusion
Recent statute and policy changes have been instituted to expedite access to ANG forces in peacetime in an effort to maintain an "Operational ANG" after U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and
Afghanistan. Operationalizing the ANG will cause profound changes in the long standing complex relationships between the ANG and the nation, the Air Force, civilian employers, and the ANG members themselves. The Air Force must be measured and deliberate when exercising 
